This post is a revised version of Self-Confidence as an Ideal.

Introduction

Rational agents have the capacity to choose actions and beliefs on the basis of reasons, instead of at random, or because they are programmed to, or because they uncritically adopt the views of others. Brushing past some details, Kant argues that all rational agents are necessarily bound to make choices about how to act in accord with a rule that he calls the categorical imperative.^[i] The categorical imperative, he claims, is the fundamental principle of morality.

The categorical imperative is “act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”^[ii] Kant’s reason for thinking that all rational agents are necessarily bound to follow this rule when making choices about how to act is, roughly and exceedingly briefly, as follows. Reasoned choices must be principled choices, and principles are rules that apply generally, not parochially. In other words, principles have the form of universally applicable laws. Making reasoned choices, then, requires making choices on the basis of maxims that you could will to be universal laws.^[iii]

I suspect that there is a close connection between the line of thought that Sayre-McCord pursues in “A Better Moral Theory” and the Kantian thoughts that I have just sketched. In this post, I will discuss that connection. I will do so by building on the ideas that I introduced in the series called The Self-Confidence Principle, so read that first.

Choice Guiding Concepts

In “A Better Moral Theory,” Sayre-McCord points out that all normative concepts have the following feature:

…normative concepts (whether moral or not) are concepts that make a claim on our allegiance, purporting to be such that their satisfaction ipso facto means – and here I purposely use a generic characterization that reaches beyond morality – someone or other has reason to act or react in certain ways to what satisfies them…

“A Better Moral Theory” page 16 version of May 2018

I will refer to this feature by saying that normative concepts are choice guiding. The fact that normative concepts are choice guiding, Sayre-McCord claims, explains what is going on in the following scenario:^[iv]

Imagine…that on our understanding of what morality’s standards actually are, a different set of standards would be (morally) better. Would this give us any reason to think that our original theory of what the standards of morality are is mistaken? I think it would; we would be finding ourselves with reason to think we had originally gotten the standards wrong…

“A Better Moral Theory” page 3 version of May 2018

In this scenario, we have found ourselves with reason to think that the our current understanding of morality’s standards is wrong because we have discovered a reason to think that our current understanding of morality is not choice guiding.^[v] Because the correct understanding of morality (whatever it is) is choice guiding, we have discovered a reason to think that our current understanding of morality is wrong.

Self-Confidence and Choice Guiding Concepts  

In this section, I will make a very tentative attempt to say why it is true that if, “on our understanding of what morality’s standards actually are, a different set of standards would be (morally) better,” then there is a reason to think that our current understanding of morality is not choice guiding.

Recall from The Self-Confidence Principle 2 that a moral theory is self-confident if and only if it follows the GVp↔Vp rule. In other words, a self-confident moral theory delivers all and only those verdicts that, by the theory’s own lights, are good verdicts.

Now, if, according to moral theory T, a different theory would be morally better, then T clearly lacks self-confidence. For, by T’s own lights, there is a different theory that delivers better verdicts. Furthermore, it is plausible that if T lacks self-confidence, then T is not choice guiding. I think that this claim is plausible for the following reason:

Suppose that you accept moral theory T, and you use it to guide your choices. Further suppose that T fails to follow the GVp↔Vp rule. If this is the case, then by T’s own lights, T has a problem. Because you use T to guide your choices, you have reason to choose to believe that T has a problem. If you believe that T has a problem, then, it seems, you shouldn’t use T to guide your choices. To put the point another way, if you believe that T has a problem, then, it seems, you shouldn’t believe that the satisfaction of the conception of morality that T expresses is on its own enough to establish that you have a reason to do anything. 

I strongly suspect that something like this line of argument is correct, but I struggle to phrase it in a way that is completely convincing. For that matter, I struggle to phrase it in a way that makes it easy to understand. I still have lots of questions about it; some of these questions are listed at the end of the first version of this post.^[vi] For now, I will return to Kant.       

Law-Like Principles

Laws tell you what to do, so a principle is not law-like unless it is choice guiding. The CI requires us to “act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” Surely you cannot will that a maxim should become a universal law unless that maxim is law-like. It follows, then, that a maxim cannot satisfy the CI unless it is choice guiding.

In “A Better Moral Theory,” Sayre-McCord claims that if “on our understanding of what morality’s standards actually are, a different set of standards would be (morally) better,” then there is a reason to think that our current conception of morality is not choice guiding. There is a clear connection between this claim and the CI. For, if our current understanding of morality is not choice guiding, then that understanding of morality does not satisfy the CI. It follows that if “on our understanding of what morality’s standards actually are, a different set of standards would be (morally) better,” then that understanding of morality does not satisfy the CI.^[vii]

To summarize:
According to moral theory T, a different moral theory would be morally better.
→
T is not self-confident.
→
T is not choice guiding.
→
T does not satisfy the CI.

Self-Confidence as an Ideal

If the foregoing is correct, then T satisfies the CI only if T is self-confident. Unfortunately, self-confidence is a very high bar. A self-confident moral theory delivers all and only those verdicts that, by the theory’s own lights, are good verdicts. A self-confident theory is, by its own lights, completely free of problems and counterexamples. This is such a stringent requirement that, practically speaking, we cannot hope to meet it. Practically speaking, then, we cannot hope to develop a moral theory that satisfies the CI. This means that we are required to either (a) abandon the CI or (b) keep the CI but admit that we cannot hope to construct a correct moral theory. I think that we should pick option (b), for the following reason.

Although it is practically impossible to construct a self-confident moral theory, it is possible to pursue self-confidence as an ideal. An ideal is a model of perfection. Even though, practically speaking, perfection is usually out of our reach, we can still use ideals to guide our choices. A better choice is one that more closely approximates the ideal.

Even though we cannot realistically hope to construct a moral theory whose principles satisfy the CI, the CI still gives us an ideal to work towards. A better moral theory, one that more closely approximates the ideal, is one whose principles come closer to being such that we can will that they should become universal laws. A better theory, then, is one that comes closer to being self-confident.

Questions

Everything that I have said in this post is tentative and incomplete. I still have lots of questions. Please see the questions section at the end of the first version of Self-Confidence as an Ideal for some of them.

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[i] Here are the details: What Kant argues is that there is a general and fundamental principle of rational choice that all beings with the capacity for rational choice are bound by and that, for imperfectly rational beings such as us, this principle is expressed as the categorical imperative.

Morality’s “law is so broad in meaning that it must be valid not merely for human beings, but for all rational beings as such, and valid not merely under contingent conditions and subject to exceptions, but with absolute necessity” (Groundwork  ed. Hill and Zweig page 210).

[ii] Groundwork ed. Hill and Zweig page 222

[iii] “…since this imperative contains, besides the law, only the necessity that the maxim conform to this law, while the law, as we have seen, contains no condition limiting it, there is nothing left over to which the maxim of action should conform except the universality of a law as such; and it is only this conformity that the imperative asserts to be necessary” (Groundwork page 222). “…the ground of every practical legislating lies objectively in the rule and in the form of universality that (according to our first principle) makes the rule fit to be a law (and possibly a law of nature)…” (Groundwork page 232).

If you are reading this, and you understand Kant better than I do, please help me improve my understanding by pointing out any mistakes that you notice.

[iv] “Moreover, this feature of our normative concepts means that competence with them carries a distinctive burden: that we be sensitive to whether the criteria we rely on in applying such concepts are such that satisfying the criteria ipso facto establishes that someone or other has reason to act or react in a certain way. Evidence to the contrary – evidence that satisfying the criteria we are relying on does not ipso facto establish reasons – constitutes a direct challenge to the criteria. Such evidence gives us grounds for revising our criteria. That is what is going on, I think, when we discover a theory of a better morality, or a theory of better practical reasons, or a theory of a better principle of induction, or a theory of a better rule for determining what we should believe in situations of uncertainty. In each case, that the alternative is better in the relevant way provides grounds for thinking our original criteria (as captured by our current best theory of the domain) do not actually establish that we have the relevant reasons, at least when those standards conflict with those identified by the theory of a better set of criteria” (“A Better Moral Theory” page 17 draft of May 2018).

[v] As he puts it, “when we discover a theory of a better morality,” we discover “evidence that satisfying the criteria we are relying on does not ipso facto establish reasons” (“A Better Moral Theory” page 16 version of May 2018).

[vi] See especially questions 5 and 6. I suspect that SM has something like the line of argument in mind, but, to be honest, I suspect that he too is having a hard time figuring out how to phrase it.

[vii] In this passage, I talk about the CI like it is not part of a moral theory. Rather, I talk about it like it is a principle that is used to regulate the selection of moral theories. Is it okay to understand Kant, or Kantianism, in this way? Also, Kant talks about using the CI to test maxims, not to test whole moral theories. Am I misunderstanding Kant by talking about using the CI to test whole theories? Please see questions 1 and 2 at the end of the first version of this post for an elaboration of these questions.

Previous posts in this series:
The Incentive Argument
The Cooperation Argument

We only have two ways of making economic decisions: the market process and the political process. Most of the time, politicians have neither the knowledge nor the incentive required to make good decisions. For this reason, the market process usually returns better decisions than the political process.

Without more detail, it is difficult to object to this argument, so I will save objections for later.

Previous post in this series:
The Incentive Argument

In a free market, each person has a right to decide which trades to engage in. For this reason, a trade will occur only if all parties agree to it. Each person can be trusted to look after their own interests, so a trade will occur only if it is beneficial for all parties.

Objections

Externalities

Sometimes, decisions affect people who have no say in those decisions. For example, future people have no say over how much pollution present people produce, and my neighbor has no say over whether I maintain a presentable lawn. In a free market, you are not required to take account for the effects that your actions have on third parties.

The Freedom to Starve

In a free market, if you don’t like your job, you can quit. If you decide not to quit, then it is safe to assume that you prefer your job over the alternatives. However, this may be because the alternatives are downright terrible. For many people, the freedom to quit feels like the freedom to choose homelessness and hunger, the freedom to lose health insurance, and so on.

Your Own Interests

Often, people do not do a good job of looking after their own interests. It is not difficult to find examples to illustrate this point. Everyone procrastinates sometimes. Many smokers continue smoking even though they want to quit. Severely mentally handicapped people cannot look after their own interests at all.

Distribution

In a free market, a trade occurs only if all parties agree to it. Highly skilled workers can expect to do well under such a system. They have something that other people want, so lots of people will agree to trade with them. People who are disabled, elderly, or unskilled cannot expect to do so well. They may have to rely on charity, and charity is not a very dependable source of support.

In this series of posts, I will look at the standard arguments for capitalism and at some common objections to them. My goal is to briefly summarize a familiar debate without taking a side. In order to keep things brief, I will not include replies to the objections.

The Incentive Argument

Private property rights are a characteristic feature of capitalism. Private property rights incentivize economic activity by rewarding people who engage in it. Without the prospect of reward, there would be much less economic activity. Economic activity is good, so an economic system that generates more of it is to be preferred.

Objections

Distribution

The size of the economic pie matters, but the way that it is distributed matters too. The market distributes wealth in a way that is unequal, or unfair, or does not maximize utility.  

Externalities

Sometimes the market creates the wrong incentives. For example, sometimes there is an incentive to pollute, or overfish, or overuse antibiotics. Also, sometimes there is not enough incentive to do scientific research or get vaccinations.

What these examples have in common is that some of the costs and/or benefits of a transaction are not borne by the parties to that transaction. Economists call costs that fall on third parties “negative externalities” and benefits that fall on third parties “positive externalities.” When externalities are present, the market does not produce an optimal outcome. Sometimes, government intervention can improve the outcome.

Selfishness and Greed

Capitalism encourages selfishness and greed. Selfishness and greed are vices, and a social system that encourages vice is worse than one that encourages virtue. Furthermore, a virtuous citizenry is the foundation of a successful society. If vice becomes too widespread, the bonds that hold society together will deteriorate.  

Unjust Original Acquisition

As things stand, property is distributed in a way that reflects historical injustices. A private property system leaves this tainted distribution in place.

Other Motivations

Personal gain is not the only thing that motivates people. We are also motivated by concern for others, by moral and religious commitments, by an impulse to create, and so on. For this reason, even in the absence of the profit motive, we will still be productive.