Previous posts in this series:
The Self-Confidence Principle 1
The Self-Confidence Principle 2

In my last post, I introduced the self-confidence principle. I will begin this post by clarifying it. As it stands, the self-confidence principle runs:

If a moral theory is not self-confident, then there is reason to think that it is incorrect.

The self-confidence principle identifies a consideration that we should take into account when we assess a moral theory. However, it does not tell us whether that consideration is decisive. If it is decisive, then a moral theory needs to be self-confident in order to be correct. If it is not decisive, then it is possible for a moral theory to be correct even though it lacks self-confidence. To keep things clear, it is best to distinguish between two different versions of the self-confidence principle:

The Strong Self-Confidence Principle: If a moral theory is not self-confident, then there is decisive reason to think that it is incorrect.

The Weak Self-Confidence Principle: If a moral theory is not self-confident, then there is defeasible reason to think that it is incorrect.

In “A Better Moral Theory,” Sayre-McCord sometimes writes as though a moral theory needs to be self-confident in order to be correct. For example, he writes that:

…an acceptable normative theory in the relevant domain must not be one that fails to meet the justificatory standards it sets. Again, satisfying this requirement does not establish a normative theory as right, but failing to meet it rules a theory out as mistaken.

“A Better Moral Theory” page 15 version of May 2018

In other places, he seems to say that a moral theory does not need to be self-confident in order to be correct. For example, he writes that:

There being a difference between one’s theory of the best normative X (the best morality, the best standards of inference, the best rules of justification…) and one’s (so far) best theory of X, necessarily provides a reason (though perhaps not a decisive reason) to think one’s (so far) best theory is wrong.

“A Better Moral Theory” page 1 draft of May 2018

This seeming inconsistency can be resolved by distinguishing between (1) the correct moral theory and (2) the correct moral theory to hold given the available evidence. I will refer to this distinction by speaking of ‘the perfect moral theory’ and ‘the best available moral theory.’

The distinction between the perfect moral theory and the best available moral theory cuts across the distinction between the strong self-confidence principle and the weak self-confidence principle, creating four versions of the self-confidence principle:

The Strong Idealistic Self-Confidence Principle: If a moral theory is not self-confident, then there is decisive reason to think that it is not perfect.

The Weak Idealistic Self-Confidence Principle: If a moral theory is not self-confident, then there is defeasible reason to think that it is not perfect.

The Strong Realistic Self-Confidence Principle: If a moral theory is not self-confident, then there is decisive reason to think that it is not the best available moral theory.

The Weak Realistic Self-Confidence Principle: If a moral theory is not self-confident, then there is defeasible reason to think that it is not the best available moral theory.

It seems to me that the SI self-confidence principle and the WR self-confidence principle are correct, but the WI self-confidence principle and the SR self-confidence principle are incorrect. If a theory lacks self-confidence, then it is certain that it is not perfect. However, it may still be the best available theory, so long as it does a better job of accommodating the evidence than any of the available alternatives.

Now that all four versions of the self-confidence principle are in play, it is possible to resolve the apparent inconsistency in “A Better Moral Theory.” On the one hand, when Sayre-McCord suggests that a moral theory needs to be self-confident in order to be correct, he can be understood as appealing to the SI self-confidence principle. On the other hand, when he suggests that a moral theory does not need to be self-confident in order to be correct, he can be understood as appealing to the WR self-confidence principle.

The second change that I think Sayre-McCord should consider making to “A Better Moral Theory” is to clearly distinguish appeals to the SI self-confidence principle from appeals to the WR self-confidence principle.

Conclusion

I began this series of posts by arguing that Enoch’s GGp→Gp formula can be defended by clarifying the operator ‘G’. Once that clarification is made, the obvious next step is to state the self-confidence principle. Once the self-confidence principle is on the table, the obvious next step is to clarify it by distinguishing between four different versions of it. After that, it becomes clear that a seeming inconsistency in “A Better Moral Theory” can be resolved by appealing to the difference between the SI self-confidence principle and the WR self-confidence principle.