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The Self-Confidence Principle 1

The purpose of this series of posts is to suggest two changes to Geoffrey Sayre-McCord’s draft paper “On a Theory of a Better Moral Theory and a Better Theory of Morality.” In my last post, I made the first suggestion. Before making the second, I need to introduce a rule that I will call the Self-Confidence Principle. I will do so by breaking the self-confidence principle down into its component parts. To begin with, consider:

The GGp→Gp Principle: If a moral theory does not follow the GGp→Gp rule, then there is reason to think that it is incorrect.

Moral theory T fails to follow the GGp→Gp rule if and only if (1) according to T, it is good for T to deliver the verdict that it is good that p and (2) T does not deliver the verdict that it is good that p.^[1] If both (1) and (2) are the case, then theory T fails to deliver a verdict that, by its own lights, is a good verdict. By its own lights, then, T has a problem. According to the GGp→Gp principle, this problem constitutes a reason to think that T is incorrect.

The thought behind the GGp→Gp principle is not limited to claims about goodness.^[2] For example, consider statements such as ‘If moral theory T delivers the verdict that it is good that T delivers the verdict that it is bad that p, then T delivers the verdict that it is bad that p’ and ‘If moral theory T delivers the verdict that it is good that T delivers the verdict that it is obligatory that p, then T delivers the verdict that it is obligatory that p.’ These statements can be abbreviated as GBp→Bp and GOp→Op. In order to capture the thought behind these statements, the GGp→Gp principle needs to be generalized. Towards that end, define:

 Vp: Moral theory T delivers verdict V about p, where that verdict is construed as a judgment about the way the world is, not as a hope about the way it might be.

Using the operator ‘V,’ the GGp→Gp principle can be generalized into:

The GVp→Vp Principle: If a moral theory does not follow the GVp→Vp rule, then there is reason to think that it is incorrect.^[3]

To illustrate the GVp→Vp principle, consider an example. Suppose that, according to utilitarianism, it is good for utilitarianism to deliver the verdict that stealing is always wrong. Further suppose that utilitarianism does not deliver the verdict that stealing is always wrong. If this is the case, the utilitarianism fails to deliver a verdict that, by its own lights, is a good verdict. By its own lights, then, utilitarianism has a problem. According to the GVp→Vp principle, this problem constitutes a reason to think that utilitarianism is incorrect.

The GVp→Vp principle is the first of two components of the self-confidence principle. The second is the Vp→GVp principle:

The Vp→GVp Principle: If a moral theory does not follow the Vp→GVp rule, then there is reason to think that it is incorrect.

Moral theory T fails to follow the Vp→GVp rule if and only if (1) T delivers verdict Vp and (2) it is not the case that, according to T, it is good for T to deliver verdict Vp. If both (1) and (2) are the case, then theory T delivers a verdict that, by its own lights, is not a good verdict. By its own lights, then, T has a problem. According to the Vp→GVp principle, this problem constitutes a reason to think that T is incorrect.

For example, suppose that utilitarianism delivers the verdict that it is sometimes permissible to steal. Further suppose that, according to utilitarianism, it is not the case that it is good for utilitarianism to deliver that verdict that it is sometimes permissible to steal. If this is the case, then utilitarianism delivers a verdict that, by its own lights, is not a good verdict. By its own lights, then, utilitarianism has a problem. According to the Vp→GVp principle, this problem constitutes a reason to think that utilitarianism is incorrect.

Say that a moral theory is self-confident if and only if it follows both the GVp→Vp rule and the Vp→GVp rule, or, we might say, follows the Vp↔GVp rule. Using this terminology, the self-confidence principle can be stated as follows:

The Self-Confidence Principle: If a moral theory is not self-confident, then there is reason to think that it is incorrect.

A self-confident theory delivers all and only those verdicts that, by its own lights, are good verdicts. If a theory is not self-confident, then, by its own lights, it has a problem. According to the self-confidence principle, this problem constitutes a reason to think that it is incorrect.

In my next post, I will finally get around to suggesting the second change that I think Sayre-McCord should consider making to “A Better Moral Theory.”

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[1] It is worth noting that the counterexamples to the GGp→Gp formula that van Someren Greve and Sayre-McCord offer are not counterexamples to the GGp→Gp principle. The examples purport to show that a moral theory could deliver verdicts that follow the GGp→Gp rule yet still be inadequate. A counterexample to the GGp→Gp principle must show that, even though a given moral theory does not follow the GGp→Gp rule, there is no reason to think that it is incorrect.

[2] Sayre-McCord makes a similar point on page 12 of “A Better Moral Theory” version of May 2018.

[3] At first glance, the GVp→Vp principle resembles a principle of completeness. This resemblance, however, is misleading. Say that a theory of domain D is complete if and only if all true statements about the objects in D are provable within the theory. In this definition of completeness, two standards of correctness are in play, truth and provability. Stated imprecisely, the GVp→Vp principle tells us that, in the domain of morality, if a verdict is good, then it can be derived from moral theory T. When the principle is stated in this imprecise way, it appears that there are two standards of correctness in play, goodness and derivability from the theory. Stated precisely, the GVp→Vp principle tell us that, in the domain of morality, if a verdict is good according to theory T, then theory that verdict can be derived from T. When the principle is stated this way, it is clear that only one standard of correctness is in play, namely, derivability from the theory. No outside standard of goodness is in play. This point makes it clear that the GVp→Vp principle is a principle of self-assessment.