The purpose of this series of posts is to suggest changes to Geoffrey Sayre-McCord’s draft paper “On a Theory of a Better Moral Theory and a Better Theory of Morality.”^[1] Some of the terminology that Sayre-McCord uses in “A Better Moral Theory” is drawn from David Enoch’s paper “Wouldn’t It Be Nice If p, Therefore, p (for a moral p).” For this reason, I will begin by discussing Enoch’s paper.

Enoch on the GGp→Gp Formula

In “Wouldn’t It Be Nice,” Enoch focuses on arguments that run ‘It would be good for q to be the case, therefore q is the case.’ As he points out, these arguments are rarely convincing. Most of the time, they are “ridiculous, paradigmatic cases of wishful thinking.”^[2] However, he thinks that they are not always hopeless. There is hope, he suggests, when q stands for ‘it would be good if p.’ In this case, the argument form under consideration becomes ‘It would be good for it to be good that p, therefore it is good that p.’ Enoch abbreviates this argument form as GGp→Gp.

To illustrate the GGp→Gp argument form, Enoch gives the following example:

Suppose that a world in which we have an utterly non-consequentialist moral status is a better world than one in which we don’t have such a status. Does this give any reason to believe that we have such moral status? 

“Wouldn’t It be Nice” 223

If it is true that GGp→Gp, then the answer to this question is ‘yes.’

First Objection to Enoch

In the remainder of this post, I will discuss two objections to Enoch. In my opinion, both objections can be overcome by clarifying the GGp→Gp argument form. The first objection is raised by Rob van Someren Greve in a paper called “Wishful Thinking in Moral Theorizing: Comment on Enoch.” The second is raised by Sayre-McCord in “A Better Moral Theory.” Both objections take the form of counterexamples.

To paraphrase van Someren Greve’s counterexample, suppose that p stands for ‘the entire actual world.’ Then GGp→Gp becomes ‘It would be good for the entire actual world to be good, therefore the entire actual world is good’.^[3] Certainly this line of reasoning is ridiculous wishful thinking.

Sayre-McCord says of van Someren Greve’s counterexample that “this version of a counter example doesn’t really work, though, since ‘good’ is not being used consistently as an operator.”^[4] However, Sayre-McCord does not say what the inconsistency is. Once the inconsistency is identified, I will argue, it becomes clear that Sayre-McCord’s counterexample is inconsistent in the same way. 

Reply to the First Objection

As I have said, I think that van Someren Greve’s counterexample can be dealt with by clarifying the GGp→Gp argument form. Two clarifications are in order.

First, van Someren Greve’s counterexample does not clearly distinguish between (a) the way the world actually is and (b) hopes about the way it might be. To keep things clear, I will use ‘it would be good if p’ to express hopes about the way the world might be and ‘p is good’ or ‘it is good that p’ to express judgments about the way it actually is.^[5]

Second, for the purposes of the GGp→Gp formula, ‘it is good that p’ should be understood to mean ‘moral theory T delivers the verdict that it is good that p.’^[6] When both clarifications are combined, the understanding of Gp that results is as follows:

Gp: Moral theory T delivers the verdict that it is good that p, where that verdict is construed as a judgment about the way the world is, not as a hope about the way it might be.

When Gp is understood in this way, the GGp→Gp formula becomes ‘If moral theory T delivers the verdict that it is good that moral theory T delivers the verdict that it is good that p, then moral theory T delivers the verdict that it is good that p.’

van Someren Greve’s example is not a counterexample to this version of the GGp→Gp formula. It is clear that ‘the actual world’ may be substituted for p without generating an unacceptable result. The statement ‘If it would be good for the entire actual world to be good, then the entire actual world is good’ generates an unacceptable result because its antecedent is obviously true. It is not obvious, however, that the antecedent of ‘If moral theory T delivers the verdict that it is good that moral theory T delivers the verdict that the entire actual world is good, then moral theory T delivers the verdict that the entire actual world is good’ is true. Whether or not it is true depends on the theory in question. Even if it is true, ‘moral theory T delivers the verdict that the entire actual world is good’ may be true as well.

Second Objection to Enoch

Sayre-McCord’s doubts about the GGp→Gp argument form rest on the following counterexample. Suppose that p stands for ‘you express sincere appreciation.’ Then GGp→Gp becomes ‘If it would be good for it to be good for you to express sincere appreciation, then it is good for you to express sincere appreciation.’ For the sake of argument, assume that it is good for you to express sincere appreciation when someone has done something good for you. If we make this assumption, then the fact that it is good for you to express sincere appreciation reflects the fact that something good has happened, namely, that someone has done something good for you. For this reason, it is true that it would be good for it to be good for you to express sincere appreciation. In other words, it is the case that GGp. However, it does not follow that Gp, for it may be the case that, in fact, no one has done anything good for you.

Reply to the Second Objection

Sayre-McCord’s counterexample can be dealt with in the same way as van Someren Greve’s. Say that GGp→Gp stands for ‘If moral theory T delivers the verdict that it is good that moral theory T delivers the verdict that it is good that p, then moral theory T delivers the verdict that it is good that p.’ When GGp→Gp is understood in this way, ‘you express sincere appreciation’ may be substituted for p without generating an unacceptable result. The statement ‘If it would be good for it to be good for you to express sincere appreciation, then it is good for you to express sincere appreciation’ generates an unacceptable result because its antecedent is true (it is true, as Sayre-McCord says, because the fact that it is good for you to express sincere appreciation reflects the fact that something good has happened, namely, that someone has done something good for you). It is not obvious, however, that the antecedent of ‘If moral theory T delivers the verdict that it is good that moral theory T delivers the verdict that it is good for you to express sincere appreciation, then moral theory T delivers the verdict that it is good for you to express sincere appreciation’ is true. Whether or not it is true depends on the theory in question. Even if it is true, ‘moral theory T delivers the verdict that it is good for you to express sincere appreciation’ may be true as well.^[7]

Conclusion

In “A Better Moral Theory,” Sayre-McCord rejects the GGp→Gp formula because he thinks that it is subject to counterexample. In my opinion, once the GGp→Gp formula is properly clarified, neither van Someren Greve’s example nor Sayre-McCord’s is a counterexample to it. I suggest modifying “A Better Moral Theory” to take this into account. 

In my next post, I will generalize and elaborate on the GGp→Gp formula. In the post after that, I will suggest another change to “A Better Moral Theory.”

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[1] Sayre-McCord, G. (2018, May) On a Theory of a Better Moral Theory and a Better Theory of Morality. Retrieved from http://philosophy.unc.edu/people/geoffrey-sayre-mccord

[2] Enoch, D. (2009). Wouldn’t It Be Nice If p, Therefore, p (for a Moral p). Utilitas, 21(2), 1. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2607074

[3] van Someren Greve, R. Wishful Thinking in Moral Theorizing: Comment on Enoch. Utilitas, 23(4).

van Someren Greve phrases this counterexample as “for every state of affairs that the actual world contains, it is true that (it would be good if that state of affairs were good).”

[4] “A Better Moral Theory” page 11 version of May 2018

[5] It is difficult to state van Someren Greve’s and Sayre-McCord’s examples in a way that both respects this distinction and is grammatical. Both examples center on the phrase ‘It would be good if p were good,’ which is supposed to correspond to GGp. This phrase should not be restated as ‘It would be good if it would be good if p’ because that is difficult even to understand. It should not be restated as ‘It would be good if it is good that p’ because that is not grammatical. It should not it be restated as ‘It is good that it is good that p’ because that does not capture the intention of either author. Finally, ‘It is good that it would be good if p’ is so odd that I am not sure whether it is ungrammatical or grammatical but difficult to understand. These difficulties suggest that the operator ‘good’ requires further clarification if it is to be used in the context of the GGp→Gp formula. I provide this clarification presently.

[6] Sayre-McCord uses expressions such as ‘by the lights of the original theory’ in a number of places in “A Better Morality.” For example, he says “still, imagine that we (tentatively, but with some confidence) arrive at a theory of what the best standards of morality would be (by the lights of our original theory)” (“A Better Moral Theory” page 3 version of May 2018). Expressions such as “by the lights of our original theory” suggest understanding Gp to mean not ‘p is good’ but ‘theory T delivers the verdict that p is good.’ However, Sayre-McCord does not clarify the GGpGp formula by explicitly stating that Gp ought to be understood in this way. As a result, he rejects the GGpGp formula.

[7] I would like to express sincere appreciation to anyone who actually read this paragraph.