Previous posts in this series:
Hume 1: Conventions
Hume 2: Justice
Hume 3: Moral Judgment

Justice and Self-Interest

Hume thinks that, in a just society, everyone benefits from the prosperity that the institution of property makes possible. Even so, he acknowledges that justice and self-interest sometimes stand opposed to one another. In a famous passage, he says:

And though it is allowed that without a regard to property, no society could subsist; yet according to the imperfect way in which human affairs are conducted, a sensible knave, in particular incidents, may think that an act of iniquity or infidelity will make a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any considerable breach in the social union and confederacy.

EM Section IX Part II Paragraph 9

The sensible knave, with his eyes on his own self-interest, reasons that the benefits of unjust conduct sometimes outweigh the costs. A handful of unjust acts will not be enough to considerably weaken the institution of property. For this reason, the knave is not worried about causing a breach in the social union. If he stands to gain by acting unjustly, and he thinks that he is unlikely to get caught, the knave reasons that it is in his interest to do so.

To put the point another way, the knave has three scenarios in mind: (1) Everyone refrains from taking the property of others. (2) No one refrains from taking the property of others. (3) Everyone else refrains from taking the property of others, but I do not, so long as I think that I am unlikely to get caught. The knave does better in scenario (1) than in scenario (2), but he does best in scenario (3).

Before replying to the knave, Hume admits that “if a man think that [the knave’s] reasoning much requires an answer, it would be a little difficult to find any which will to him appear satisfactory and convincing.”^[1] In other words, Hume admits that the reply that he is about to give is unlikely to convince the knave. With this in mind, Hume’s reply to the knave is that:

…in all ingenuous natures, the antipathy to treachery and roguery is too strong to be counterbalanced by any views of profit or pecuniary advantage. Inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review of our own conduct; these are circumstances, very requisite to happiness, and will be cherished and cultivated by every honest man…

EM Section IX Part II Paragraph 10

In other words, Hume think that there is value in living a virtuous life, and this value outweighs whatever advantage unjust conduct might bring. Hume does not say exactly why he thinks that the knave will not be convinced by this reply, but it is not difficult to guess at the reason. I will do so in the next section.

Morality and Self-Interest

If the knave is only concerned with his own self-interest, then he will reason that the benefits of immoral conduct sometimes outweigh the costs. Just as before, the knave will have three scenarios in mind: (1) Everyone behaves morally. (2) No one behaves morally. (3) Everyone else behaves morally, but I do not, so long as I think that I am unlikely to get caught. The knave does better in scenario (1) than in scenario (2), but he does best in scenario (3). For this reason, the knave will not be convinced by Hume’s appeal to the value of a virtuous life.^[2]

Although Hume’s appeal to the value of a virtuous life will not convince the knave to be just, it will convince plenty of other people. Most people are concerned with other things besides their own self-interest.^[3] For all normal people, virtue is among these other things. Only a psychopath would reason the way that the knave does.

Recall that, for Hume, the general point of view is the “standard of virtue and morality.”^[4] At the end of “On Why Hume’s General Point of View Isn’t Ideal – And Shouldn’t Be,” Sayre-McCord quotes Hume’s remark that the general point of view represents “in a manner, the party of human-kind against vice or disorder, its common enemy.”^[5] Sayre-McCord adds that “this is a party that we all have reason to join.”^[6] Hume’s failure to offer a reply that will convince the knave shows that these remarks are not quite correct. The general point of view does not represent the party of all humankind. Rather, it is the party of all normal humans, the party of non-knaves. And it is a party that the knave has no reason to join.

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[1] EM Section IX Part II Paragraph 10

[2] Hume states that the knave’s reasoning applies only to justice, not to the other virtues. “Treating vice with the greatest candour, and making it all possible concessions, we must acknowledge that there is not, in any instance, the smallest pretext for giving it the preference above virtue, with a view of self-interest; except, perhaps, in the case of justice…” (EM Section IX Part II Paragraph 9). I do not see how he can maintain this while at the same time admitting that the knave will be unconvinced by his appeal to the value of a virtuous life.

Perhaps the knave will admit that some of the traits that Hume considers virtues are preferable to the corresponding vices. For example, even the knave would prefer to be witty and charming instead of dull and off-putting. However, it seems to me that virtues such as benevolence and courage are just as vulnerable to the knave’s reasoning as justice. As is, if I may put it this way, the virtue of morality. That is, the virtue of using the general point of view to regulate one’s moral judgments.

[3] This is not true if, as economists sometimes do, we understand ‘self-interest’ to encompass anything whatsoever that you are concerned with. In Hume’s discussions of self-interest, however, he does not understand it this way.  

[4] “…every particular person’s pleasure and interest being different, ’tis impossible men cou’d ever agree in their sentiments and judgments, unless they chose some common point of view, from which they might survey their object, and which might cause it to appear the same to all of them. Now, in judging of characters, the only interest or pleasure, which appears the same to every spectator, is that of the person himself, whose character is examin’d; or that of persons, who have a connexion with him. And tho’ such interests and pleasures touch us more faintly than our own, yet being more constant and universal, they counter-ballance the latter even in practice, and are alone admitted in speculation as the standard of virtue and morality.” (T 3.3.1.30) Sayre-McCord quotes part of this passage at the end of “On Why Hume’s General Point of View Isn’t Ideal – And Shouldn’t Be.”

[5] EM Section IX Part I Paragraph 9

[6] “On Why Hume’s General Point of View Isn’t Ideal – And Shouldn’t Be” Page 228