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Hume 1: Conventions

After Hume explains what conventions are, he points out that they are all over the place. He uses the notion of a convention to explain the purpose of all sorts of institutions and social practices, including promise making, sexual norms, property rights, and government. This post will focus on his discussion of property rights. When Hume uses the word ‘justice,’ he is usually talking about property rights.

Hume favors liberal markets and opposes attempts to enforce “an equal distribution of property.”^[1] He thinks that such attempts are “really, at bottom, impracticable; and were they not so, would be extremely pernicious to human society.”^[2] However, his opposition to egalitarianism might seem to be in tension with some of his other remarks. For example:

That there be a separation or distinction of possessions, and that this separation be steady and constant; this is absolutely required by the interests of society, and hence the origin of justice and property. What possessions are assigned to particular persons; this is, generally speaking, pretty indifferent; and is often determined by very frivolous views and considerations.

Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix III, Footnote 3

If Hume thinks that “what possessions are assigned to particular persons” is “pretty indifferent,” why would he oppose distributing property equally? The answer can be found by looking at his discussion of property rights in more detail. Once we have the answer, we will be well placed to understand the role that conventions play in Hume’s theory of justice.

Mutual Benefit

Hume argues that property rights make a peaceful, orderly society possible.^[3] The alternative is “violence and an universal licence.”^[4] In a state of universal license, economic cooperation will not occur, and the prosperity that cooperation generates will be foregone.^[5]

In a just society, everyone benefits from the prosperity that peace and order make possible.^[6] However, not every peaceful and orderly society is just. Some societies are peaceful and orderly, yet so oppressive that some of their members are worse off than they would have been in a state of universal license. In these societies, the institution of property is not mutually beneficial.

Pretty Indifferent but Not Entirely Indifferent

Hume is “pretty indifferent” to “what possessions are assigned to particular persons,” but he is not entirely indifferent. In his opinion, the distribution of property rights is a pretty indifferent matter, so long as they are distributed in a way that is mutually beneficial. A distribution that is not mutually beneficial is unjust and not a matter of indifference. Hume can explain his opposition to egalitarianism, then, by arguing that an egalitarian distribution is not mutually beneficial. In order to do so, he needs to argue that, if we attempt to distribute property equally, some people will end up worse off than they would have been in a state of universal license.

According to Hume, if we attempt to distribute property equally, we will run into a number of problems. First, if we “render possessions ever so equal, men’s different degrees of art, care, and industry will immediately break that equality.” For this reason, “the most rigorous inquisition too is requisite to watch every inequality on its first appearance; and the most severe jurisdiction, to punish and redress it,” and “so much authority must soon degenerate into tyranny, and be exerted with great partialities.”  Second, when property is distributed equally, there is much less incentive to work. The absence of this incentive will “reduce society to the most extreme indigence; and instead of preventing want and beggary in a few, render it unavoidable to the whole community.” Third, “perfect equality of possessions, destroying all subordination, weakens extremely the authority of magistracy, and must reduce all power nearly to a level, as well as property.”^[7]

If these three problems are bad enough, they will cause some people to be worse off than they would have been in a state of universal license. Consequently, Hume will have no trouble explaining why he opposes egalitarianism. If they are not bad enough, then Hume will have to find another way to explain his opposition. At it turns out, there is another way available to him. In the next section, I will discuss this alternative.

Steady and Constant

In order to create peace and order, property rights must be “steady and constant.” Changes – especially frequent, unpredictable changes – create disorder and weaken the public’s loyalty to the institution of property.^[8] When we consider switching from one distribution of property rights to another, these costs must be weighed against whatever benefits the switch is expected to bring.

Hume lived in eighteenth century Scotland. In eighteenth century Scotland, property was not distributed equally. A big change would have been required to equalize the distribution. According to Hume, the costs of such a change outweigh its benefits, if it has any benefits at all. For this reason, the change is not a good idea.

In order to make this argument work, Hume does not need to claim that, if we attempt to distribute property equally, some people will end up worse off than they would have been in a state of universal license. All he needs to claim is that the benefits of the proposed change do not justify the costs.

Property Rights as a Convention

Now that we are familiar with objections that Hume raises against egalitarianism, we are well placed to understand the rest of his theory of justice. In this section, I will look at the role that conventions play in that theory. In the following section, I will look at at Hume’s discussion of the virtue of justice.

In Hume 1, I highlighted five features of conventions: mutual benefit, multiple solutions, different preferences, unplanned agreement, and reciprocal performance. The institution of property rights, as Hume understands it, has all five of these features:

• A just distribution of property rights is mutually beneficial.
• The institution of property solves a problem. It allows us to avoid a state of universal license. There are multiple solutions to this problem because there are many different ways to distribute property rights. Some distributions are not mutually beneficial, but plenty are.
• Different people will fare differently depending on how property rights are distributed. For this reason, different people have different preferences about how those rights are distributed.
• Sometimes, contracts and legislative decrees are used to assign property rights. However, the assignment is often made without explicit planning. For example, suppose that two herders allow their flocks to graze a field on alternate days. They may have fallen into this pattern without an explicit promise or agreement. If the pattern continues for some time, it takes on the character of an institution, and one herder may rightly feel aggrieved if the other violates it.
• It is pointless to refrain from taking the property of others unless you expect that other people will reciprocate by refraining as well. To use Hume’s example, suppose “that it should be a virtuous man’s fate to fall into the society of ruffians.” In this case, “his particular regard to justice being no longer of use to his own safety or that of others, he must consult the dictates of self-preservation alone.”^[9]

Because it exhibits these five features, it is appropriate to say that institution of property is a convention.^[10]

The Virtue of Justice

Hume distinguishes between two types of virtue, natural and artificial. ‘Artifice’ is his somewhat outdated term for an institution or social convention. His point is that some virtues depend on institutions or conventions, whereas others do not. Loyalty to the state is a particularly clear example of an artificial virtue. In the absence of a state, it is not possible to have the virtue of loyalty to the state. The virtue depends on the institution because, in the absence of the institution, it is not possible to have the virtue.

In contrast, the natural virtues do not depend on institutions. Generosity, courage, and wit are among the natural virtues. It is possible to be generous, courageous, and witty regardless of what institutions and social conventions are in place.

Justice is a central example of an artificial virtue. The just person has a “commitment to conform to general rules established by conventions, given that the conventions are mutually advantageous, and that others are doing their share as well.”^[11] As we have seen, the institution of property is a convention. Therefore, the just person will comply with whatever scheme of property rights happens to be in place, so long as (1) that scheme is mutually beneficial and (2) other people can be expected to comply as well. Justice is an artificial virtue because, in the absence of the institution of property, it is not possible to be just.

To conclude this post, note that justice is a fairly conservative virtue. So long as requirements (1) and (2) are met, justice recommends complying with whatever scheme of property rights happens to be in place. Justice recommends switching to a different scheme only if requirement (1) or requirement (2) is not met. Even when other considerations – for example, considerations of welfare – recommend a switch, considerations of justice may stand opposed to the change. For example, justice stands opposed to any change, even a Pareto efficient change, if other people cannot be expected to go along with that change. If other people cannot be expected to go along with the change, requirement (2) is not met.^[12]

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[1] EM Section III  Part II Paragraph 3

[2] EM Section III Part II Paragraph 5

[3] “General peace and order are the attendants of justice or a general abstinence from the possessions of others.” (EM Appendix III, Paragraph 3) The phrase ‘peace and order’ occurs four times in the Treatise and six times in the EM.

[4] “In preserving society, we make much greater advances in the acquiring possessions, than in the solitary and forlorn condition, which must follow upon violence and an universal licence.” (T 3.2.2.13)

[5] “When every individual person labours apart, and only for himself, his force is too small to execute any considerable work.” (T 3.2.2.3)

[6] To my knowledge, Hume does not give explicit consideration to social organizations, such as slavery, that are beneficial for some people but harmful for others. However, as we will see shortly, his discussion of the virtue of justice makes it clear that he would see such arrangements as unjust.

Also, in Section III Part I of the EM, he does consider the case of the relationship between people and animals. This case makes it clear that, where there is no mutual benefit, there are no duties of justice. When Hume talks about justice, then, he has in mind arrangements that are mutually beneficial. 

Furthermore, both David Gauthier (in “David Hume, Contractarian”) and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (in a draft paper called “Hume on the Artificial Virtues”) see mutual benefit as central to Hume’s account of justice.

[7] All of the quotes in this paragraph are from EM Section III Part II Paragraph 5.

[8] That this is Hume’s opinion is demonstrated by his discussion of the more or less analogous case of revolutionary change in government. He writes that “tho’, on some occasions, it may be justifiable, both in sound politics and morality, to resist supreme power, ’tis certain, that in the ordinary course of human affairs nothing can be more pernicious and criminal; and that besides the convulsions, which always attend revolutions, such a practice tends directly to the subversion of all government, and the causing an universal anarchy and confusion among mankind.” (T 3.2.10.1)

[9] EM Section III Part I Paragraph 9

[10] “If by convention be meant a sense of common interest; which sense each man feels in his own breast, which he remarks in his fellows, and which carries him, in concurrence with others, into a general plan or system of actions, which tends to public utility; it must be owned, that, in this sense, justice arises from human conventions.” (EM Appendix III, Paragraph 7)

In “David Hume, Contractarian,” David Gauthier writes “with respect to property and justice, Hume is in essence a Hobbist.” The account of Hume’s theory of property and justice that I have outlined in this post does have a number of similarities with Hobbes’. I hope to discuss some differences in future posts.

[11] This quote is from page 25 of Geoffrey’s Sayre-McCord’s draft paper “Hume on the Artificial Virtues” draft of 7/8/14. Sayre-McCord thinks that this motive underlies all of the artificial virtues, not just justice. Hume does not explicitly state the motive that underlies the artificial virtues. This omission has lead to a debate over what he thought that motive is. In “Hume on the Artificial Virtues,” Sayre-McCord canvasses this debate before making his own proposal. I will follow Sayre-McCord’s proposal in this post and in future posts.

[12] Because justice is a fairly conservative virtue, it sometimes recommends complying with social arrangements that are not so great. In order to illustrate this point, return to the example of slavery. Surely some types of slavery are so horrible that the people who suffer them are worse off than they would have been in a state of universal license. This may not be the case for every type of slavery, however. I am thinking here, for example, of a Greek slave who is employed as a tutor by an upper class Roman family. If the Greek slave is better off than he would have been in a state of universal license, then, according to Hume’s theory, his enslavement is just. Perhaps this is a flaw in Hume’s theory.

As I mentioned in footnote 7, Hume does think that political revolution can, on rare occasion, be warranted. It is open to Hume, then, to say that the revolutionary overthrow of the Roman social order that keeps the Greek tutor in bondage is warranted. It is not open to Hume, however, to say that it is warranted on the grounds that that social order is unjust. For, according to Hume’s theory, the Greek’s bondage is just. Perhaps Hume can fix this problem by making the following modification to his theory:

As I have said, what matters is whether the Greek is better off enslaved to the Roman family than he would have been in a state of universal license. When Hume makes this sort of comparison, he tends to focus on whether the person under consideration is better off economically. The upper class Roman family gives the Greek food to eat, and they put a roof over his head, and the work that they require him to do is intellectual work, not hard physical labor. It may be the case, then, that the Greek is better off economically than he would have been is a state of universal license. Yet when the moral degradation of slavery is taken into account, he may be worse off. If Hume modifies his theory to take this into account, he can say that the enslavement of the Greek is unjust. This modification fixes the problem without making really fundamental changes to Hume’s theory.